LIS as Applied Philosophy of Information: A Reappraisal by Floridi, Luciano
LIBRARY TRENDS, Vol. 52, No. 3, Winter 2004, pp. 658–665
© 2004 The Board of Trustees, University of Illinois
Afterword
LIS as Applied Philosophy of Information:
A Reappraisal
Luciano Floridi
Library information science (LIS) should develop its foundation in
terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless
suggestion. Where else could information science look for its conceptual
foundations if not in PI? However, accepting this proposal means moving
away from one of the few solid alternatives currently available in the ﬁeld,
namely, providing LIS with a foundation in terms of social epistemology
(SE). This is no trivial move, so some reasonable reluctance is to be expect-
ed. To overcome it, the proposal needs to be more than just acceptable; it
must be convincing. In Floridi (2002a), I have articulated some of the rea-
sons why I believe that PI can fulﬁll the foundationalist needs better than
SE can. I won’t rehearse them here. I ﬁnd them compelling, but I am ready
to change my mind if counterarguments become available. Rather, in this
contribution, I wish to clarify some aspects of my proposal (Floridi, 2002a)
in favor of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI. I won’t try to show you
that I am right in suggesting that PI may provide a foundation for LIS bet-
ter than SE. My more modest goal is to remove some ambiguities and pos-
sible misunderstandings that might prevent the correct evaluation of my
position, so that disagreement can become more constructive.
We often hear about the differences between the ordinary librarian,
busily involved in managing and delivering a public service, and the infor-
mation scientist or the LIS expert, deep in theoretical speculations. The line
of reasoning here seems that a foundation for LIS should satisfy both and
that this is something that PI cannot achieve, hence the objection that PI
is not “social” enough. I accept the inference, but I disagree on the premise.
For I think we should distinguish as clearly and neatly as possible between
three main layers.
Luciano Floridi, Dipartimento di Scienze Filosoﬁche, Universitá di Bari, and Department of
Philosophy, Oxford University, Wolfson College, Oxford, OX2 6QP, UK
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There is a ﬁrst layer where we deal with libraries, their contents and ser-
vices. Compare this with the accountant’s calculations and ﬁnancial proce-
dures. One may wish to develop a theory of everyday mathematics and its
social practices—surely this would be a worthy and interesting study—but
it seems impossible to confuse it with the study of mathematics as a formal
science. The latter is a second layer. It is what LIS amounts to, what one
learns, with different degrees of complexity, through the university curric-
ulum that educates a librarian or an information specialist. There is then a
third layer, in which only a minority of people is interested. We call it foun-
dational. For mathematics, it is the philosophy of mathematics. I suggested
PI for LIS. My point here is that it is important to acknowledge and respect
the distinction between these three layers; otherwise one may criticize x for
not delivering y when x is not there to deliver y in the ﬁrst place. When check-
ing whether the bank charged you too much for an overdraft, you are not
expected to provide an analysis of the arithmetic involved in terms of Peano’s
axioms. Likewise, a scientist may be happy with a clear understanding of sta-
tistics without ever wishing to enter into the philosophical debate on the
foundations of probability theory. So I do not see why LIS cannot be pro-
vided with an equally theoretical approach, capable of addressing issues that
the ordinary practitioner and the expert would deem too abstract to deserve
attention in everyday practices (mind that I’m talking about layers not peo-
ple; one can wear different hats in different contexts; this is not the issue
here). In the end, I agree that PI should seek to explain a very wide range
of phenomena and practices. I would add that this is precisely the challenge
ahead. The scope of PI spans a whole variety of practices, precisely because
the aim of PI is foundationalist.
If we assume for a moment that LIS is applied PI, and that PI can pro-
vide LIS with a conceptual foundation, the next question concerns how,
more speciﬁcally, PI and LIS may interact. This special issue provides plen-
ty of evidence of the sort of fruitful investigations prompted by a PI ap-
proach to LIS. Three more examples may further illustrate the point and
shed some more light on the SE vs. PI debate. A PI approach to the foun-
dations of LIS may be expected to work on the ontology of its (i.e., LIS’s)
“objects,” on a substantial theory of information dynamics, and on an eth-
ical approach to the domain of information. I shall say a bit more on each
topic in the following pages, but let me stress here that if you ﬁnd these areas
of inquiry important, you also may want to concede that they fall beyond
the scope of any SE approach. Let us now return to PI itself.
A simple way of introducing PI is by referring to it as the philosophical
discipline that attempts to answer the question “What is information?” I
understand that the question itself can be tiresome, at least because there
is no simple way of answering it, despite its misleading simplicity. Ordinary
moves, like checking the dictionary, consulting an encyclopaedia, compil-
ing a survey, or piling up quotations, won’t do, and not just because we are
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the ones who write those sources and entries anyway. Imagine trying to
answer questions like “What is life?” “What is the mind?” or “What is mean-
ing?” in the same way. Questions such as these are ways of opening a dia-
logue and launching investigations that may keep generations of scholars
and scientists busy. They are like road signs indicating the direction in which
we should move. Complaining about the lack of precise answers is point-
less. Philosophical questions are inevitably open-ended. We have to leave
them behind to step ahead.
Information is a slippery topic. This explains its philosophical attrac-
tiveness but does not justify sloppy treatment. On the contrary, before we
attempt our ﬁrst steps beyond the “big-question sign” on this icy surface,
we should make sure that our skates are razor-sharp. The slipperier the
topic, the sharper the skates. Thus enters conceptual analysis, which can
help us to understand the next point.
It is vital to realize that there is no single concept or uniﬁed theory of
information (UTI) as such. The same people who think otherwise would
be happy to acknowledge that it makes no sense to ask for a satisfactory
single deﬁnition for food in general, and yet we have a much better idea
of what counts as food than of what may count as information. What we
need is analysis, analysis, and more analysis.
At this point we should be wary of the opposite mistake, namely think-
ing that if there is no UTI then there is no theory at all. Wrong. Abandon-
ing the search for a UTI implies giving up the assumption that there might
be an Ur-concept of information at the roots of a hierarchical reconstruc-
tion of the multifarious world of information phenomena. But, as I have
argued in Floridi (2003a), the various meanings, uses, applications and types
of information, including the related phenomena in the environment, still
can be interpreted as a system gravitating around a core notion with theo-
retical priority. The core notion works as a hermeneutical device that in-
ﬂuences, interrelates, and helps to access other notions. In PI, this central
role has long been claimed by factual or epistemically oriented semantic infor-
mation. The basic idea is simple. To understand what information is, the
best thing to do is to start by analyzing it in terms of the knowledge it can
yield about its reference. Factual information is the most important and in-
ﬂuential sense in which information qua information “can be said,” to use
an Aristotelian phrase. However, I strongly doubt (perhaps I should be more
honest and state that I do not believe at all) that any successful attempt can
be made to reduce all other concepts to factual information. Factual infor-
mation is like the capital of the informational archipelagos, crucially posi-
tioned to provide a clear grasp of what information is and a privileged gate-
way to other important concepts that are interconnected but not necessarily
reducible to a single Ur-concept. The right model is not a hierarchy but a
distributed network of connected concepts, linked by mutual and dynam-
ic inﬂuences that are not necessarily genetic or genealogical.
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From what I have just said, it should be clear that I do not think, let
alone suggest, that there is only one concept of information; that I do not
subscribe to a communication-based concept of information; that I am
skeptical of any uniﬁed theory of information based on any privileged con-
cept (including Shannon’s theory of information); that it is far from me
to argue that we need a philosophy of “digital” information because of the
IT revolution and the computational turn (although the latter has certain-
ly made the pressing need for PI more obvious and broadly felt); but that I
consider PI deeply concerned with the historical and logical dynamics of
information as well as with its conceptual analysis. In Floridi (2002c) I ex-
plicitly supported the importance of a reinterpretation of several episodes
in the history of philosophy in the light of the new informational paradigm.
And in Floridi (2002b) I have tried to apply the historical analysis to the
transmission of a speciﬁc corpus of texts.
Another thesis to which I do not subscribe concerns the existence of
information in the world. I’m neither a naive nor a critical realist, but I’m
not an antirealist either (one nice thing about PI is that it helps us to dis-
lodge old dichotomies). The position I have being trying to develop and
support is that information comprises data, which are (part of, or) in the
world independently of the epistemic agent. Data are better seen as con-
straining affordances, that is, differences that invite or facilitate (“afford”)
certain interpretations in relation to intelligent data-processors like us, while
impeding, or making more difﬁcult (“constrain”), some others. So “where”
is information? An analogy may help to introduce the right answer. Would
you say that there is no food in the world unless there are food-consumers?
Of course not. Even if there is no form of life on planet Z, there may still
be nutrients, let’s say some minerals or water, which could sustain some form
of life on Z. On the other hand, grass is food only for a grass-eater, and to
a cat it is as good as a piece of plastic. Mutatis mutandis, one may argue that
a radiograph is a piece of information about my lungs only for someone
who can read it, whereas someone else may object that reading the radio-
graph is only a way of acknowledging the presence of the relevant piece of
information in the environment. So where should we place “information”?
The debate about the locus informationis has seen a tension between inter-
nalists and externalists. Some people place information “inside” the mind
(e.g., the radiologist’s understanding of the radiograph of my lungs); some
others insist that it is in the world (e.g., the state of my lungs represented
by the radiograph). This is a pointless dispute. When we consider food, it
is clear that it is neither in the world, as mere nutrients, nor is just a func-
tion of the consumers’ digestive systems. Likewise, information, and seman-
tics in general, is one of those “two-dimensional things” that are neither here
nor there, but at the interface between us and the environment, like a
threshold between the two spaces. They are relational phenomena. This
“liminal” conception of information is not reducible to some form of ex-
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ternalism (naturalization of information) or internalism (information is in
the mind of the beholder), so I endorse neither. I’m a liminalist, if this can
be a label. I much prefer it to ontologically amphibious.
Is “liminalism” then just another form of antirealism? The answer de-
pends on what we mean by the latter, and it requires some further expla-
nations. When data acquire their meaning, we have what philosophers of
language call “content.” In Floridi (in press-a) and Floridi (in press-b), I
have defended the view that to have factual information we need meaning-
ful data (contents) that are also truthful. Two points need to be clariﬁed
here. First, content is a necessary condition for knowledge, but it is not the
only one. Knowledge means something very precise in epistemology: it is
content that is at least true (epistemologists speak of true beliefs) and pos-
sibly justiﬁed, that is, supported by some good reasons (guessing correctly
that p is not yet knowing that p). The analysis of knowledge as true, justiﬁed
belief is not satisfactory (see Floridi, in press-d), but this is no reason to think
that we can do without the true condition. Speaking of “false knowledge”
is nonsense, exactly like speaking of “married bachelors.” Nobody can know
that the earth is ﬂat for the simple fact that it is not. Yet libraries are full of
“false knowledge.” So speaking of LIS as a discipline in which we are con-
cerned with knowledge instead of content is at least imprecise and at worst
mistaken. LIS deals with contents understood as meaningful data. This has
nothing to do with data handling in the sense of a mechanical and brain-
less crunching and management of bytes. It is, rather, connected with the
activity of stewardship of a semantic environment.
The second point concerns a possible commitment to a standard cor-
respondence theory of truth. I said above that I do not think we should
privilege a communication-based concept of information. The usual alter-
native—another tempting dichotomy again—is to analyze information in
terms of the representational contribution it makes to our understanding
of the world. So do I believe that information represents the world, at least
in some cases? Not quite, for I consider it the wrong question to ask. I take
the view, neither uncommon nor very popular among philosophers, that
the semanticization of data is a modeling process at some level of abstrac-
tion (LoA). There is no space here to explain the methodology of LoAs
(Floridi & Sanders, in press-b), but one may grasp its gist by considering
that, according to the methodology, any access to data (and hence, any
access to whatever aspect of the world is under scrutiny) is mediated by an
ontological commitment to a level of abstraction that can be roughly un-
derstood as an interface. For example, we are epistemic agents inevitably
committed to a perception of space as Euclidean. Now, the primary func-
tion of factual information seems to me to be the design, by the agents
inhabiting it, of an environment as meaningful as possible to the agents
themselves. Only part of this semanticization is adaptation oriented. Most
of it is “superﬂuous.” Once again, don’t get me wrong: I’m not supporting
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the thesis that “adaptation is beautiful.” Quite the opposite, the secret of
our special place in nature seems to me to be hidden exactly in our “su-
perﬂuous” detachment from the world caused by our giving far more sense
to it than it actually needs to make us prosper like any other species. We
are the animals that oversemanticize, and for no survival purpose. But let’s
go back to the realist issue. We build our understanding of the world by
taking full advantage of the constraining affordances (data) offered by our
external sources at different LoA. Certainly, data only underdetermine the
choice of a particular LoA and the nature of its outcome, but underdeter-
mination itself is not Boolean and is inversely proportional to the degree
of coherence among our LoAs. Consider the following crossword analogy.
Normally, a crossword is a two-dimensional puzzle, but one can easily imag-
ine a three-dimensional version (a cube) in which coherence among the
string of letters is even more difﬁcult to achieve. Now consider an n-dimen-
sional version, with n as large as one may wish. For example, a four-dimen-
sional crossword would be one in which strings of letters have to satisfy the
constraints that also regulate the diagonals of the cube, and so forth. This
is what I mean by multidimensional intercoherence among LoAs.
Coherence among LoAs, however, may still guarantee at most some kind
of internal “realism,” if one forgets that the nature of the observables is also
determined, partly, by the data being modeled. Whether empirical or con-
ceptual, data afford only a certain range of models, and not all models are
afforded equally easily. Another analogy may help here. Suppose you have
to build a shelter. The design and complexity of the shelter may vary, but
there is a limited range of “realistic” possibilities, determined by the nature
of the resources available, the goals, etc. (size, building materials, location,
weather, physical and biological environment, working force, technical skills,
purposes, security, etc.). Not any shelter can be built. And the type of shel-
ter that will be built more often will be the one that is more likely to take
close-to-optimal advantage of the resources available. The same applies to
data. Data are resources that make possible the construction of certain
models, and the best models are those better tuned to their constraining
affordances. This is what I mean by adequacy. Coherence and adequacy do
not entail nor support naive or direct realism, or a correspondence theory
of truth as this is ordinarily presented. Ultimately, LoAs construct models
of data systems; they do not represent or photograph or portray or photo-
copy, or keyhole-spy or map or show or uncover or fax or monitor or . . . the
intrinsic nature of the systems they analyze no more than an igloo describes
the intrinsic nature of snow or the Parthenon indicates the real properties
of stones. We neither discover nor invent the world; we design it. So we
understand it derivatively, only insofar as we understand its models. The
world as we experience it every day is the outcome of our modeling its data
with a degree of intra-LoAs coherence as great as one may wish. This is nei-
ther a realist nor an antirealist but a constructionist view of information.
664 library trends/winter 2004
Approaching PI from a liminalist and constructionist perspective means
adopting a metaphysical stance (Floridi, in press-c). And it is from this stance
that information ethics (IE) should be evaluated. I have explained in other
contexts why I believe in the importance of developing an ethics of stew-
ardship toward the infosphere (see Floridi, 1999; Floridi and Sanders, 2001;
Floridi and Sanders, 2002; Floridi and Sanders, in press-a). Here, I only wish
to clarify an apparent misunderstanding. When I defend the minimal and
overridable, intrinsic moral worth of informational objects (see Floridi, 2003b),
I do not mean to refer to the moral value of an e-mail, or of Newton’s Prin-
cipia, or of any other piece of well-formed and meaningful data. Honestly,
this would be rather silly. What I am suggesting is to approach the analysis
of Being informationally, by adopting a minimal common ontology whereby
human beings as well as animals, plants, artifacts, and so forth are interpret-
ed as informational entities.
I hope the following analogy may be helpful, even if it is not really fair
to the philosophical thesis at stake. Imagine looking at the whole universe
from a chemical level of abstraction: you are 70% water and 30% something
else. Now consider an informational level of abstraction. You are 100% a
cluster of data. More precisely, you (as any other entity) are a discrete, self-
contained, encapsulated package containing (i) the appropriate data struc-
tures, which constitute the nature of the entity in question: state of the
object, its unique identity, and attributes and (ii) a collection of operations,
functions, or procedures, which are activated by various interactions or stim-
uli, namely messages received from other objects or changes within itself,
and correspondingly deﬁne how the object behaves or reacts to them. At
this level of abstraction, informational objects as such, rather than just liv-
ing systems in general, are raised to the role of patients of any action. IE is
then just an evolution of environmental ethics. Its fundamental tenet is that
something is more elemental than life, namely Being understood informa-
tionally, and hence, something more fundamental than pleasure and pain,
namely “entropy” (this is not the physicists’ concept of entropy; entropy here
means destruction of informational objects, that is, nothingness, in the vo-
cabulary of the old substantialist metaphysics of Being). According to IE,
one also should evaluate the duty of any moral agent in terms of contribu-
tion to the growth of the infosphere and any process, action, or event that
negatively affects the whole infosphere—not just an informational object—
as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an instance of evil. The eth-
ical question asked by IE is “What is good for an informational entity and
the infosphere in general?” The answer is provided by a minimalist theory
of deserts: any informational entity is recognized to be the center of some
basic ethical claims, which deserve recognition and should help to regulate
the implementation of any information process involving it, if possible.
Approval or disapproval of any information process is then based on how
the latter affects the essence of the informational entities it involves and,
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more generally, the whole infosphere, i.e., on how successful or unsuccess-
ful it is in respecting the ethical claims attributable to the informational
entities involved, and hence in improving or impoverishing the infosphere.
IE brings to ultimate completion the process of enlarging the concept of
what may count as a center of minimal moral concern, which now includes
every informational entity. Clearly, the relation between IE and LIS would
be worth investigating.
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[PI is a thriving area of research. Here I have limited myself to provide
a list of works where I introduced it as a new philosophical ﬁeld and I dis-
cussed its foundations. References to current literature less Floridi-centric
can be found in the cited works. All the following papers are available at
http://www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/~ﬂoridi/ under “publications and papers on-
line.”]
References
Floridi, L. (1999). Information ethics: On the theoretical foundations of computer ethics. Ethics
and Information Technology, 1(1), 37–56.
Floridi, L. (2002a). On deﬁning library and information science as applied philosophy of
information. Social Epistemology, 16(1), 37–49.
Floridi, L. (2002b). Sextus Empiricus: The transmission and recovery of Pyrrhonism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Floridi, L. (2002c). What is the philosophy of information? Metaphilosophy, 33(1–2), 123–145.
Floridi, L. (2003a). Information. In L. Floridi (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of com-
puting and information (pp. 40–61). New York: Blackwell.
Floridi, L. (2003b). On the intrinsic value of information objects and the infosphere. Ethics
and Information Technology, 4(4), 287–304.
Floridi, L. (in press-a). Is information meaningful data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Floridi, L. (in press-b). Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information. Minds and Ma-
chines.
Floridi, L. (in press-c). Two approaches to the philosophy of information. Minds and Machines.
Floridi, L. (in press-d). On the logical insolvability of the Gettier problem. Synthese.
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2001). On the morality of artiﬁcial agents. In Proceedings of CEPE
2001, Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry, Lancaster University, December 14–16.
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2002). Computer ethics: Mapping the foundationalist debate.
Ethics and Information Technology, 4(1), 1–9.
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (in press-a). Internet ethics: The constructionist values of Homo
Poieticus. In R. Cavalier (Ed.), The impact of the Internet on our moral lives. Albany, NY: SUNY
Press.
Floridi, L., and Sanders, J. W. (in press-b). The method of abstraction. In M. Negrotti (Ed.),
Yearbook of the artiﬁcial. Nature, culture and technology. Models in contemporary sciences. Bern:
Peter Lang.
